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Project Prevention is a non-profit organi-zation that pays drug-addicted women 
$300 cash in exchange for sterilization or 
long-term birth-control.1 It was formed in 
1997 by Barbara Harris, who had adopted 
four of the eight children of a California 
addict. Her group claims to promote a 
social good. Children born to drug addicts 
are often neglected or abused; others are 
stillborn, have genetic or developmental 
defects, or are born addicted and suffer 
through withdrawal. Nearly all who survive 
require special care—at a public cost of 
billions of dollars a year in the US alone. 
Beyond increasing public awareness of 
the problem, “Project Prevention seeks 
to reduce the burden of this social prob-
lem on taxpayers, trim down social worker 
caseloads, and alleviate from our clients 
the burden of having children that will 
potentially be taken away.” Moreover, 
“Unlike incarceration, Project Prevention 
is extremely cost effective and does not 
punish the participants.” As of mid-2018, 
over 7,000 women have been paid to be 
sterilized or given long-term birth control 
implants and over 280 men received 
vasectomies; these are addicts who earlier 
produced a total of about 6,000 living 
children who are in foster care or are wait-
ing adoption. 
The addict may use the cash for 
anything, including getting another fix. 
Indeed, the Project has used such slogans 
as “Don’t let pregnancy get in the way of 
your crack habit.”2 The group does offer 
referrals to treatment programs, but does 
not fund them. Critics claim the Project 
has no concern for the addicts, and that 
it targets minorities and the poor. But 
although the proportion of Black “clients” 
is roughly twice that of the general popu-
lation, the largest group (about 60%) 
is White. Some argue that addicts are 
incapable of making such a life-altering 
decision rationally; given their addiction, 
a cash incentive is seductive at best, coer-
cive at worst. Others claim that our right to 
reproduce should not be bargained away, 
just as we should not sell ourselves—or be 
seduced—into slavery. 
Ms. Harris is quoted as saying, “We don’t 
allow dogs to breed ... We neuter them. We 
try to keep them from having unwanted 
puppies, and yet these women are liter-
ally having litters of children.” Yet she has 
also said: “Some people are so into the 
women and their rights to get pregnant 
that they seem to forget about the rights 
of the kids. They act like these children 
don’t matter. People need to realize these 
women don’t want to have babies that are 
taken away from them.”3 
But Mary Barr, a spokesperson for the 
National Advocates for Pregnant Women 
in the US, says “Today I’m a successful 
woman with a house and family ... But 
I used to be homeless and addicted to 
crack cocaine ... My children are happy 
and healthy. My daughter has just started 
studying at college to be a doctor, on a 
full scholarship. If Project Prevention had 
got to me, she wouldn’t exist.”4
CHAPTER SIX
Utilitarianism
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6.1 THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
Utilitarianism, the focus of this chapter, is the name for a cluster of closely 
related ethical theories that embody a distinctive way of thinking about 
moral issues and public policy. We may preview aspects of utilitarian think-
ing in the operations of Project Prevention: the aim to promote a social 
good, concern for the welfare of children, the balancing of costs and bene-
fits, and the single-minded focus on results. In this morally provocative 
case, the foundation claims the social good is achieved largely by prevent-
ing harm: it works to reduce the social and financial burden of unwanted 
and often afflicted children born to drug addicts, to prevent the miser-
able lives such children are likely to have, to discourage the practice of 
repeated abortions, and so on. The incentive payment for sterilization is 
modest, so the total financial cost is comparatively small, and the addicts 
receive money, not punishment; rehabilitation efforts would cost much 
more—and they are seldom successful. The addicts are happy to receive 
the cash. Yes, they might use the money for another fix; but that would 
likely have occurred by other means anyway, and it is greatly outweighed 
by the benefits. Moral critics may raise doubts about whether the women 
are in a proper state to make such a decision, whether such an incentive 
is coercive, whether reproductive rights should be traded, whether the 
program targets minorities or disrespects women—but their doubts and 
ethical scruples only serve to restrain us from doing what is needed to 
prevent harm and make the world a better place. So says the utilitarian. 
Utilitarianism, like ethical egoism, is a type of consequentialism. 
Consequentialist moral theories, as we have seen, focus on the outcomes 
of actions and practices, emphasize instrumental reasoning (the selec-
tion of efficient means for given ends), and enjoin us to produce the most 
good. The development of economics and the spread of economic models 
have made this cost–benefit orientation commonplace in our age. As a 
result, for us it is difficult to recapture just how breathtakingly radical 
this way of thinking was when utilitarianism was promulgated in nine-
teenth-century Britain by Jeremy Bentham, James Mill (1773–1836), and his 
son John Stuart Mill.5 An account of the intellectual history of this period 
in Britain is well beyond our scope; here I can only mention a few motifs 
that such an account would include: the spread of democratic and repub-
lican models, the promotion of social reform through legislation, debates 
over slavery and the slave trade, the awakening of the women’s suffrage 
movement, earnest charity, the global extension of colonialism during the 
long reign of Queen Victoria, the rise of the social sciences, and faith in 
the possibility of social progress. Utilitarianism is deeply embedded in 
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105CHAPTER SIX: UTILITARIANISM
all these, being both a reflection of them and an impetus for them. Most 
radical theories are striking in what they reject and in the simplicity of 
what they propose. In practice, the apparent simplicity usually gives way 
to knotty complexities, and theorists need to reclaim and rehabilitate 
some of what was first rejected. All this is true for utilitarianism. Let us 
begin with its striking simplicity. 
One of the problems of moral theory is the relationship between the 
right and the good, between what ethics requires of us and the prospect 
of gain or loss of the things we value. We have seen the tension that can 
arise: Abraham’s Divine Command ethics required him to sacrifice his son, 
whom he loved. Firmness in the right (righteousness) overrode concern 
for any human desire or common good, or claimed righteousness itself to 
be the only good. Consequentialist theories, by contrast, assert a simple, 
straightforward connection: what is right is to secure what is good. 
Instead of contending with Ten Commandments, ancient and contested 
sacred texts, varying cultural norms, multiple and conflicting natural 
rights, or other such complexities, consequentialism offers morality a 
single principle, a master key that can always and everywhere unlock any 
moral dilemma: maximize the good. There is no need to prioritize prin-
ciples or resolve their conflicts when there is only one valid principle. 
The principle that we are morally obligated to promote the good is the 
Principle of Utility.
Moreover, ethical theories that make what is right a matter of follow-
ing age-old rules or commands or human rights impose a kind of harness 
or restraint on human action. (This is why Bentham opposed the concept 
of natural rights.) They are the moralizing weight of the past. Such rules 
keep us in line, but they do not improve the world. They are not progres-
sive. Utilitarianism says in effect, “Throw off the harness of stultifying 
morality! Remove the shackles of prior constraints! Look to the future 
and consider how what you do might make a difference. Morality is not 
a weight; it is a force. Think about what will actually improve lives and 
make the world a better place—for that is the true purpose of morality!” 
For example, inherited morality, fossilized in Victorian law, may state 
that marriage is a life-long sacred union, a contract bound by oaths; that 
wives cannot own property or divorce their husbands; that the marriage 
must continue even when the relationship is emotionally empty or abusive. 
Such a morality enforces misery and improves nothing. The utilitarian 
instead directs the moral force toward acts and practices that would make 
life better. This attention to outcomes or results gives ethics an empiri-
cal cast; the moral agent needs to know about causes and effects, and to 
adjust efforts in accord with actual experience. 
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To summarize: consequentialism is radical in that: (1) it reduces morality 
to a single master principle; (2) it directly links right action to the maxi-
mization of the good; (3) it looks to the future and downplays the binding 
moral status of rules, codes, rights, and precedent; and (4) it calibrates 
actions by experience, by the outcomes achieved, the differences made. 
6.2 FROM EGOISM TO UTILITARIANISM
Although consequentialism has only one master principle, the maximiza-
tion of the good, it requires two specifications or subsidiary principles. 
They answer two important questions: “What is the good?” and “Whose 
good is to be maximized?” 
The philosophical study of value is called axiology. In ethics, it focuses 
on the nature of the good (in aesthetics, it includes the study of beauty). 
Utilitarians are united in the view that utility is the good. But this generic 
term masks subtle differences among them. Early utilitarians, like many 
egoists, embraced the view that pleasure is the good. John Stuart Mill, as we 
shall see, subtly shifts this concept of utility further, preferring happiness 
as the good, though it consists in pleasures. Others prefer the satisfaction 
of desire, and economists have tended to use the term welfare synony-
mously. Later utilitarians often prefer the term well-being. 
The second question—“Consequences for whom?”—is a way of asking, 
“Who counts, who matters, when one considers the costs and benefits 
of an act or practice?” The answer lays down a distributive principle; it 
determines the normative way to distribute the good (and any collateral 
harm). An ethical egoist counts only herself; her welfare alone matters 
in determining what is right. Hobbes, as we saw, professed that model. 
Bentham’s keen interest in social reform drew him to a different distrib-
utive principle: especially in public issues, he claimed that one should 
seek the greatest good for the greatest number. This formulation is now 
known as the defining doctrine of utilitarianism. When an act maximizes 
the good, producing the best possible total consequences for the great-
est number, we call that act optimific. For a utilitarian, only the optimific 
act is the morally right act, the action we should take; any other action 
would be wrong. 
Although Bentham elaborates his views and Mill modifies them signifi-
cantly, it is prudent to begin with the vanilla version of utilitarianism that 
they share:
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“X is right” = “X produces the greatest good for the greatest 
number,” or 
“X is right” = “X is the optimific act.” 
Even this basic formulation displays many attractive aspects, including 
those that made it radical: (1) the simplicity of a single principle that harmo-
nizes the right and the good; (2) the focus on the future and objective 
results; and (3) the move from morality as constraints on action to moral-
ity as a goad for betterment. But there are more. (4) Utilitarianism entails 
agent impartiality. Egoism, as I noted, entails an unwarranted partiality: 
the egoist counts; others do not. But when one considers “the greatest 
number,” each individual counts as one, including the agent. Another 
distinguished utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), put the point this 
way: “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the 
point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.”6 
(5) This impartiality is also egalitarian, since it not only rejects discrim-
ination among individuals, it implies that all individuals matter; all are 
capable and worthy of experiencing the good. (6) Indeed, given the usual 
theories of value it embraces, it may actually expand the moral commu-
nity: any creature that can suffer (that is, experience pain or harm, as well as 
pleasure) has moral standing, and their suffering must be registered as a 
negative effect of action. The capacity to suffer, wrote Bentham, should 
mark “an insuperable line” in how we treat all creatures. An early cham-
pion of the moral standing of animals, Bentham asserted: “The question 
is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”7 Finally, 
(7) the theory offers a hope and guide for the formation of public policy 
and the resolution of ethical conflicts. It directs our moral energies away 
from prior commitments, individual differences, and personal prejudices 
toward participation in the construction of the collective good, the better-
ment of our world. 
6.3 BENTHAM’S CALCULUS
Jeremy Bentham was an English social reformer and philosopher who 
took a law degree but never practiced, preferring instead to direct his 
considerable energy to projects for the public good. A child prodigy, 
Bentham’s brilliance was edged with eccentricity: for example, before he 
died at age 84, he had made extensive preparations for his body’s dissec-
tion and its preservation and display as an “auto-icon.”8 As we have seen, 
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Bentham was a hedonist and enemy of natural rights. His most important 
philosophical statements were presented in his influential 1789 work, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, which sets forth his 
ethical system. Blessed with family wealth, Bentham pursued wide-ranging 
research on topics such as prison design (he designed the “panopticon”9) 
and penal code reform, electoral reform, economic theory and fiscal 
practice, humane treatment of animals, and refrigeration processes. In a 
posthumously published essay, he argued for the liberalization of laws 
regarding homosexuality. 
The ringing simplicity of Bentham’s “greatest good for the greatest 
number” principle quickly encountered complexities. If our only moral 
task is to maximize the good, which is pleasure, we need some way to 
quantify and measure the pleasure and pain produced, both for a single 
individual and for a group.10 Indeed, the measurement must be precise 
enough to compare the pleasures and pains of alternative actions, so that 
one might identify the optimific act. And the measurement must assign 
negative weight, not neutrality, to pain. One must subtract the harm done 
from the good achieved to get the net benefit. 
Since the process of measurement implies a unit of measurement, 
Bentham used the term hedon for a unit of pleasure and dolor for a unit 
of pain. He cleverly developed a “hedonic calculus” based on these units. 
He proposed to consider several aspects of pleasure: 
1. Intensity—how strong is the pleasure (or pain)?
2. Duration—how long will the pleasure (or pain) last?
3. Certainty—how probable is it that one will experience the 
pleasure (or pain)?
4. Propinquity—how long would one have to wait for the pleasure 
(or pain)?
5. Fecundity—how likely is it that the pleasure (or pain) will breed 
other pleasures (or pains)?
6. Purity—how unlikely is it that the pleasure will lead to pains 
(or the pain to pleasures)?
To incorporate “the greatest number,” he added the distributive criterion:
7. Extent—how many people will experience pleasure (or pain) as a 
result?
Bentham proposed a basic moral decision procedure: (1) specify the alter-
native actions; (2) for each action, using the seven criteria, compute the 
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total hedons and subtract the dolors to calculate the net pleasure; (3) 
identify and do the optimific act, that is, the one that produces the great-
est net pleasure. 
It may be easy to imagine using this “calculus” in a rough-and-ready 
way to make decisions. For example, Emily decides whether the plea-
sure of yet one more drink is worth the hangover that is likely to follow. 
Tyrone decides whether the pain of paying for a swimming pool will 
be worth the pleasure that he and his family will have. But this proce-
dure is not really a calculus; it lacks crucial aspects. (1) Bentham never 
really stated just what a single hedon or dolor is, nor did he explain an 
adequate technique for measuring them. Clearly, he intended a subjective 
measure, because he discussed factors that affect individual differences 
in experiencing pain and pleasure; and he focused on actual pleasure 
and pain, not an ideal calculation. But he gave us no way of determin-
ing just how many hedons Emily’s next drink would be, nor how many 
dolors she could expect for her hangover. These terms are merely names 
for units of pleasure and pain, not definitions. This is both a theoret-
ical and a practical problem. (2) Bentham did not specify how the six 
factors affecting pleasure are to be weighed in relation to each other. 
How much low-grade, long-lasting pleasure equals an intense but brief 
pleasure? How should we compare a mild pleasure that is certain to be 
enjoyed tonight with an intense pleasure that is less certain and perhaps 
a month away? And with regard to pain, is it, so to speak, better to pull 
the Band-Aid off slowly with some pain, or to snatch it off rapidly but 
with intense pain? (3) Bentham’s formulation requires two basic maxi-
mizations: the greatest pleasure and the greatest number. But these two 
are independent, of course; they do not automatically increase in paral-
lel. How should one weigh extent against pleasure? That is, how are we 
to choose between a policy that would give a high number of net hedons 
to a few individuals and a policy that would give a few net hedons to a 
very large number of people? Bentham does not stipulate an answer. 
Think just how complicated it would be to apply Bentham’s calculus 
to the Project Prevention operation. Besides the pleasures and pains of 
everyone affected, one has the additional problem of considering the 
impact on “possible individuals”—infants who will never be born as a 
result of their program. 
The details of quantifying and measuring subjective states became the 
work of later psychologists; the details of a calculus of utility were left to 
later economists. But the vision of Bentham’s utilitarianism was clear if 
not precise: actions, policies, and practices should be aimed at produc-
ing the greatest net good for the greatest number. 
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6.4 JOHN STUART MILL
One of Bentham’s closest friends was James Mill, a Scottish philosopher, 
historian, and public intellectual. When Mill’s wife delivered their first child, 
a boy named John Stuart, Bentham became his godfather. Mill declared 
that he would bring up this child to be a great advocate for utilitarian-
ism, and his plan was shockingly successful. It helped that the boy was a 
genius.11 But the education was rigorous: young Mill was homeschooled 
under the demanding and restrictive tutelage of his father. The results 
were astounding: he began Greek at the age of three; at eight, he learned 
Latin. The list of works he had read by age thirteen is enormous, most in 
the original languages. He would become one of the most influential philos-
ophers of liberalism. But this intensive academic training unsurprisingly 
took its toll. As Mill famously recounts in his Autobiography, when he was 
twenty, he suffered a breakdown so severe that he contemplated suicide. 
Yet he reasoned his way out of his depression: believing his emotional 
development was stunted, he began reading Romantic poetry—taking 
doses of poetry as though it was medicine—until he gradually recovered. 
He became a staunch advocate of freedom and happiness. 
His later biography is as fascinating as his early years. He was employed 
by the East India Company for thirty-five years, rising in the ranks to 
become responsible for all official correspondence with India—though 
he never once visited the country. He fell in love with a married woman, 
Harriet Taylor, a relationship that scandalized Victorian England, though 
they eventually married. Harriet was a brilliant thinker and writer who 
undoubtedly contributed to Mill’s work. Mill authored the greatest defense 
of personal freedom ever penned: On Liberty. An opponent of slavery, he 
wrote “On the Negro Question” in 1850 as a rebuttal to a racist essay by 
the Scottish intellectual Thomas Carlyle. He was elected to Parliament, 
where in 1867 he introduced the first legislation to grant women suffrage. 
It failed. But in 1869, Mill wrote The Subjection of Women, a sustained argu-
ment for the equality of women. On these and many other social issues, 
Mill is a subtle yet forceful thinker, a progressive who seems to read “the 
right side of history.” His life and work comprise an exemplary utilitar-
ian program. 
6.5 QUALITATIVE HEDONISM
Mill first presented his classic account in a series of articles in Fraser’s 
Magazine for Town and Country in 1861. They were reprinted in 1863 as a 
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single text simply called Utilitarianism, and it has become a canonical 
text in ethical theory. By the time it appeared, the doctrine of utilitari-
anism was both influential and controversial, and Mill wrote his essay to 
explain and defend the doctrine. It may be read as a set of defensive and 
persuasive responses to fourteen objections to the theory (unnumbered 
in Mill’s text, but I have paraphrased them in Figure 2). He considers each 
of the objections in turn, following an introductory chapter in which he 
sets forth the problem to be addressed and his purpose.12 In the course of 
his argument, Mill presents and refines Bentham’s “greatest happiness 
principle” (a version of the Principle of Utility that names happiness as 
the good), extending his account, discussing its implications, and portray-
ing the quality of life the utilitarian seeks.
The first objection—utilitarianism rejects pleasure (Obj. 1)—Mill 
dismisses as an “ignorant blunder.” The second, however—the claim that 
it is base to reduce the human good to sensual pleasure (Obj. 2)—inspires 
a response that introduces a significant and controversial amendment 
to the theory. While Bentham had acknowledged different sources of 
pleasure, Mill claims that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable 
and valuable than others.” This view is now called qualitative hedonism. 
According to Mill, there is a hierarchy of pleasures in which “mental plea-
sures,” for example, are better, worthier, than sensual pleasures. Human 
beings require and prefer pleasures that employ “their higher faculties.” 
Mill writes:
Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the 
lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s 
pleasures; no intelligent person would consent to be a fool, no 
instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and 
conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be 
persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied 
with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what 
they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all 
the desires which they have in common with him.... It is better to be 
a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a 
different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the 
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.13
There are three critical points to make about this remarkable explica-
tion. (1) One might initially think that Mill’s qualitative distinctions are 
reducible to Bentham’s quantitative criteria, so there is nothing really 
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FIGURE 2 MILL’S UTILITARIANISM
 A SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED
Objections to Utilitarianism
Chapter 2
Obj. 1.  Utilitarianism is opposed to pleasure. 
Obj. 2.  Utilitarians suppose that life has no higher end than pleasure—a base 
doctrine “worthy only of swine.” 
Obj. 3.  Happiness cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action 
because: (a) it is unattainable; (b) we are not entitled to happiness; 
and (c) we can do without happiness.
Obj. 4.  The utilitarian standard is beyond the reach of human beings: it is 
expecting too much of people to require that they shall always act to 
promote the general interests of society. 
Obj. 5.  Utilitarianism makes people “cold and unsympathizing”; it “chills their 
moral feelings.”
Obj. 6.  Utilitarianism is a godless doctrine. 
Obj. 7.  Utilitarianism replaces principled morality with expediency. 
Obj. 8.  Utilitarianism is impossible to practice because there is not sufficient 
time, prior to acting, to calculate and weigh the possible effects of 
several possible actions on the general happiness. 
Obj. 9.  People who practice utilitarianism will tend to make an exception for 
themselves. 
Chapter 3
Obj. 10.  Utilitarianism has no natural sanction, no natural basis for its binding 
force, its obligations, or its motives. 
Chapter 4
Obj. 11.  There is no proof of the Principle of Utility.
Obj. 12.  Virtue is not regarded as a good by utilitarians. 
Obj. 13.  A virtuous person acts without any thought of the pleasure he or 
she will receive in fulfilling obligations; at the very least, increasing 
pleasures is not always the overriding motive of a virtuous person. 
Chapter 5
Obj. 14.  Utilitarianism cannot account for justice, because justice is opposed 
to the expedient; justice is giving people what they deserve—not what 
will make them happy. 
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new here. Perhaps mental pleasures produce more hedons than sensual 
pleasures because they are more enduring, fecund, and pure, for exam-
ple. Although Mill accepts that argument, he goes further in this passage: 
having the capacity for such pleasures is a good in itself. Indeed, it seems 
to be a higher good than actual experiences of lower pleasures. Note 
that Mill does not say “It is better to be a human being satisfied than a 
pig satisfied”; he says “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a 
pig satisfied.” If some pains are better than some pleasures, then a new 
criterion has been introduced, a factor that makes qualitative distinc-
tions among pleasures and pains. Pleasure is not the only good; perhaps 
it is not even what ultimately governs the good. As the political philoso-
pher Michael Sandel (b. 1953) has observed, “Mill saves utilitarianism from 
the charge that it reduces everything to a crude calculus of pleasure and 
pain, but only by invoking a moral ideal of human dignity and personal-
ity independent of utility itself.”14
(2) This view that pleasures, experiences, or activities form a hierarchy 
of worthiness has been an influential tenet of Western culture since Plato. 
It is largely based on such a doctrine that we have decided it is better to 
teach physics or history in high school than billiards or basket-weaving. 
But how are we to determine which of two pleasures or activities is the 
higher or better? Mill proposes a superficially simple test: ask people who 
are competent and experienced in both. If we are wondering whether, say, 
rugby or poetry is the better activity, it will not help to ask people who 
are fanatics for either rugby or poetry; rather, we must ask people who 
are expert at both rugby and poetry. Only they are in a position to make 
a valid comparison. Mill says, “The judgment of those who are qualified 
by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, 
must be admitted as final.”15 
Some philosophers deny that any justification for such hierarchical 
distinctions can be found. While there may be a basis to discriminate 
good rugby play from bad, superior poems from inferior ones, these 
skeptics argue there is no basis to judge poetry superior to rugby, or 
vice versa.16 These distinctions of low and high activities are largely 
a matter of personal prejudice, they say. In any event, most philoso-
phers regard Mill’s test as a surprisingly silly proposal. (Imagine trying 
to assemble the focus group of those rare individuals who are expert 
in both rugby and poetry.) Nonetheless, Mill believes that judging the 
quality of a pleasure to be gained from an activity requires knowledge 
and direct experience of it, and he seems to believe also that people will 
naturally converge in their judgments. So, although such judgments are 
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subjective, they will naturally form a consensus—and that is the only 
sort of test that is possible. 
(3) The third point: a hint of circularity is present in Mill’s notion that we 
are to consult people who are “susceptible to both classes of pleasures” 
and defer to their judgments. But how could we identify individuals with 
such a susceptibility or capability except by the actual judgments they 
make? If someone familiar with both prefers rock-and-roll to opera, we 
can always say she simply doesn’t appreciate the good of opera, she is 
not really susceptible to its pleasures. It seems we must accept the judg-
ments of experts, but can know them to be expert only by their judgments. 
Mill’s shift to qualitative hedonism is reflected in his preference for 
happiness as the good, though he retains its foundation in pleasures. The 
concept of happiness he advocated is “not a life of rapture; but moments 
of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and 
various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the 
passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more 
from life than it is capable of bestowing.”17 In Mill’s discussion, the concept 
of happiness slides from a specific feeling to a broader, vaguer, more 
inclusive concept of the positive quality of an enjoyed, flourishing life. 
But the concept is not empty of meaning, nor is this range of meaning 
illegitimate. Though Mill characterizes a life of happiness, he does not 
imagine that individuals will find happiness in exactly the same activi-
ties or experiences. Some people love music; others love adventures in 
nature; others develop a passion for chess. But these are sources of their 
happiness—ultimately components of a happy life—and Mill’s liberalism 
would never intentionally impose a notion of happiness that restricted 
personal freedom. He believed we can acknowledge these important indi-
vidual differences while still giving a substantive, general characterization 
of happiness as the ultimate desire of all. 
6.6 THE PROOF OF UTILITY
But is there any proof of the Principle of Utility (Obj. 11)? Is it possible to 
prove that happiness—whatever the details may be—is the good? Although 
Mill acknowledged that “ultimate ends do not admit of proof,” he does 
offer the only sort of proof of which the Principle of Utility is “suscepti-
ble.” He asserts:
“The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is 
that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is 
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that people hear it.... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence 
it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people 
do actually desire it ... No reason can be given why the general 
happiness is desirable, except that each person ... desires his own 
happiness. [Thus,] we have not only all the proof which the case 
admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is 
a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and 
the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all 
persons.”18
But Mill recognizes that the Principle of Utility requires more: it is 
not enough to prove that happiness is a good; we need proof that it is 
the good, the only good. Is it true that happiness is the only thing people 
ultimately desire? Although individuals may variously value music or 
adventure or virtue for itself, they desire it as a component of their happi-
ness. Of course, Mill is aware that people may desire things that leave 
them unhappy, and some souls may in fact choose a wretched life, but 
he believes these choices are not rationally intelligible. Such choices can 
only be explained by interpreting them as an irrational, misguided, or 
perverted attempt to secure happiness. 
Years later, the English philosopher G.E. Moore (1873–1958) objected to 
this “proof” as linguistic sleight of hand. Moore noted that “visible” means 
capable of being seen; “audible” means capable of being heard—but “desir-
able,” as Mill is using the term, does not mean capable of being desired; it 
means worthy of being desired. Visible things and audible sounds are not 
necessarily worthy of being seen or heard. The analogy is false. 
But Mill may have been asserting ethical naturalism: his point may simply 
be that moral values are grounded in human nature, and that it is human 
nature to desire happiness. Thus, what is worth desiring will be a func-
tion of what humans by nature desire. His larger point is that genuinely 
rational action always aims at the good as it is perceived; and happiness 
is, by human nature, what all such action seeks—therefore happiness is 
the good, the only good, or the all-embracing good. 
One can easily understand the problem of proof that Mill faces: it is 
the problem of proving intrinsic value. Imagine this scenario: a mother 
getting ready to leave her house, patiently responding to the persistent 
“why?” questions of her young daughter. “Why are you leaving now?” 
To catch the bus. “Why are you taking the bus?” To get to work. “Why are 
you going to work?” To earn money. “Why do you want money?” So that 
I can pay for our rent and clothes and our toys and all the things we want 
and need. “Why do you have to do all that?” So we’ll all be happy. “Why 
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do you want to be happy?”—and at this point she stops. Because it’s good 
to be happy. All of those intermediate steps—the bus, work, the money—
they are means to an end. They have value, but it is extrinsic value. Their 
value is drawn from something extrinsic to them. When better means to 
the same end appear, their value is diminished: if the mother buys a car, 
she may no longer value the bus as much. But the end of this chain, happi-
ness, has intrinsic value. It is good for its own sake, and is not selected 
as a means to something else. We can prove extrinsic value by showing 
it is an efficient means to a given end. But there is no proof outside itself 
for something’s intrinsic value. Its value is recognized; it is self-justifying, 
not justified by its usefulness in obtaining something else.19 
6.7 FROM ACTS TO RULES
The utilitarian understands that when a moral agent is faced with a choice, 
the actual consequences are never a certainty; and the further into the 
future we consider our actions’ effects, the less certain we are of them. 
Therefore, the agent’s calculation is to be made in terms of reasonable 
expectations as to outcomes. Certainly, an agent can be blamed for miscal-
culating, for ignoring relevant considerations, or for basing an action on 
unreasonable prospects. But although some would insist on a review of 
eventual actual consequences to evaluate the act, everyone would expect 
the agent only to do what would reasonably be judged optimific given the 
best information at the time. 
Still, one might argue that utilitarianism seems to require so much of 
moral agents as to be impossible to comply in practice. First, there are 
the issues of attention and time. It seems to require continual calculation, 
because any act is wrong if there is an alternative that would have more 
utility. But often there is not sufficient time to weigh possible effects on 
the general happiness of innumerable possible actions (Obj. 8). It requires 
a vigorous and perceptive moral imagination to frame all of one’s alter-
natives. In addition, utilitarianism seems to be unreasonably demanding. 
It sets the highest and best possible action—always doing the utmost to 
promote the greatest good—as the minimum standard for moral behavior 
(Obj. 4). This is simply beyond the reach of human beings. Since one has a 
duty to do the optimific act, there is no possibility of going beyond duty 
for extraordinary good; that is, supererogation is eliminated. Moreover, 
there is no respite from the demands of morality, since a good utilitar-
ian, it seems, should calculate every action, indeed every possible action, 
at every moment. 
BV MoralPhilo-F.indd   116 2018-10-26   12:46 PM
Review Copy - Material Under Copyright
117CHAPTER SIX: UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism puts the agent in an unmanageable predicament. Imagine 
that Cynthia has $1,000 in the bank. She may be going about her busi-
ness, not thinking about her savings—but, as a utilitarian, she should 
be. Should she keep the money there to let her savings grow? Or should 
she pay a debt with it? Or should she spend it for something that would 
bring her joy? Or perhaps she should divide it among ten needy friends? 
Should she lend it to someone in need? Or should she send it to any one 
of a hundred charities—maybe disaster relief or sponsorship of chil-
dren? Which of these would be the optimific act producing the greatest 
good for the greatest number? All this calculation is so exhausting as to 
be impossible; yet anything less than the optimific act would be wrong—
and Cynthia was not thinking she faced an ethical decision at all. But she 
should also be thinking of the good she could do with her car or by acting 
as a helpful volunteer instead of using her savings. This swirling sense of 
possibilities for promoting happiness would fill her waking moments—in 
fact, she should also consider how much good she could do if she reduced 
her sleeping hours. A diligent utilitarian, it seems, is likely to experience 
both moral and physical (and perhaps financial) exhaustion.20 
Furthermore, a utilitarian moral agent must face this predicament 
without any fixed ethical principles, beyond the injunction to promote 
the greatest good. She has no moral standard for choosing the means to 
an end; indeed, no means are prohibited; the expedient action is taken 
to be the right action (Obj. 7). Justice, for example, normally a powerful 
moral ideal, does not serve as a moral touchstone; it is waved in favor of 
expediency (Obj. 14). Consider these cases:
A. The sheriff knows that a murder was committed by an unknown 
assailant who quickly left the country, and there is no chance 
to apprehend him. But there is a dangerous man, a local man, 
innocent of this murder, but tied to other killings. The sheriff 
plants evidence that implicates this man and finally leads 
to his imprisonment. He reasons that it promotes the social 
good, calming the fears of citizens by “solving” a murder, and 
protecting the public by putting a dangerous and otherwise 
guilty criminal behind bars. 
B. Members of an isolated commune determine that the optimific 
arrangement would require that one of them become a slave 
to the others. They correctly calculate that, although the 
negative costs to the slave would be significant, they would 
be outweighed by the good enjoyed by others. They decide to 
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determine who will be the slave by having the least specialized 
team members draw lots. 
Even if the greatest happiness is in fact produced in both cases, one might 
ask, “But what about justice?” Is it just to frame a man for a crime he didn’t 
commit or to enslave someone at random for the benefits to others? Or 
is justice, like natural rights, a nonsensical restraint on doing the most 
good? 
In part, these and similar objections and scenarios arise because of the 
focus on actions. What I called the vanilla version of the theory, its purest 
version, is known as act utilitarianism. Recall that it asserts:
“X is the right act” = “X is the optimific act”
Mill gradually pulls away from this straightforward act utilitarianism. 
He moves toward what is now called rule utilitarianism.21 This is a more 
complex form of the theory, which asserts:
“X is the right act” = “X is prescribed by one of a set of rules, which, 
if followed, would produce the greatest good for the greatest 
number”
The relevant calculation of maximal utility thus shifts from individual 
acts to rules or principles. Under rule utilitarianism, the situation of the 
moral agent becomes more manageable: one is not faced with evaluat-
ing all possible actions at every moment; instead, one follows rules that 
have been tested for on-the-whole utility-production. Mill’s answer to the 
“insufficient time” objection (Obj. 7) is that “there has been ample time, 
namely, the whole past duration of the human species.” The received rules 
we have learned are continually tested in human experience, however. As 
Mill says, “The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of 
every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, and in a progressive 
state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on.”22 
As to justice, which Mill regards as “the only real difficulty in the util-
itarian theory of morality,” he claims “Justice is a name for certain moral 
requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of 
social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any 
others.”23 This talk of “corollaries,” “precepts,” and “requirements” suggests 
a recognition of moral principles, yet Mill seems to claim that, although 
an agent may start from a stock of moral rules and apply available moral 
BV MoralPhilo-F.indd   118 2018-10-26   12:46 PM
Review Copy - Material Under Copyright
119CHAPTER SIX: UTILITARIANISM
principles in reasoning, nevertheless, in the end the decision comes down 
to the utility of individual acts. He says: 
“Particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so 
important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice. 
Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable but a duty to steal 
or take by force the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap and 
compel to officiate the only qualified medical practitioner. In such 
cases ... we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other 
moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason 
of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful 
accommodation of language ... we are saved from the necessity of 
maintaining that there can be laudable injustice.... It has always 
been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency.”24
Nonetheless, it seems that Mill has introduced another hierarchy: appar-
ently there is a “scale of social utility” in which some requirements stand 
lower while others, like justice, stand higher; and the higher carry greater 
moral obligation. The explication of Mill’s system seems to require three 
types or tiers of rules or principles: (1) Basic are the ethical rules we learn 
from common experience, like Don’t kill or inflict pain needlessly, or Don’t 
lie, cheat, or steal. These are tested, morally useful rules. But sometimes 
they may conflict. (2) To resolve such situations, we need rules about rules; 
that is, we need principles that prioritize the rules: Life is more import-
ant than property, or Justice outweighs the benefits gained by enslavement. 
But even these cannot resolve every moral situation one may encounter. 
(3) When no rule applies, we turn to the master rule (sometimes called 
“the remainder rule”), which is act utilitarianism: Do what you reasonably 
expect to produce the greatest good for the greatest number.
There is an important and complex issue that hides in Mill’s discussion. 
If one claims that each and every morally right act must maximize util-
ity, even acts involving justice or other moral principles, rules are at best 
a shorthand guide to what is right. Rules have no special status and rule 
utilitarianism is then fully reducible to act utilitarianism. Perpetual back-
ground calculation of individual acts is still required. But if it is the rules 
that have a utility independent of individual acts, if we turn to calculat-
ing the utility of individual acts only when our tiers of rules fail to resolve 
a problematic situation, then act utilitarianism is only a failsafe, a last 
resort. Rule utilitarianism is not then reducible to a straightforward act 
utilitarianism. But this entails that we may find ourselves in situations in 
which we are obliged to follow a rule that has great utility, despite the fact 
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that in our current situation, it is not optimific. It suggests that following 
judicious rules may do more good over the long haul than trying to do 
the most good in each and every situation. But how then can we test and 
assure the utility of a rule? To put the critical question simply: when it is 
pressed to the extreme, must rule utilitarianism either transform into a 
deontological theory or collapse into act utilitarianism?
Project Prevention, our opening case, runs on rule utilitarianism: it 
has general policies—a $300 stipend paid in cash, traded for sterilization, 
only offered to addicts, and so on—which are justified, it claims, by their 
utility. These policies work for the greater good. But one could imagine 
a case that fit all the policies, but in which the prospects were not good. 
In such a situation, one would ask: is it better to follow the policies which 
have high utility (rule utilitarianism), or to resort to a case-by-case judg-
ment (act utilitarianism)? 
The interpretation of rule utilitarianism and the status of moral rules 
remain controversial to this day—even among committed advocates. Some 
have proposed that it is best to apply the test of utility to practices rather 
than rules or acts. We would therefore test the practice of slavery for the 
production of the greatest good for the greatest number, not a particular 
case or rule; the practice of paying addicts for sterilization, rather than 
a particular exchange. This has predictably been called practice utilitari-
anism. And most of the same questions of interpretation raised with rule 
utilitarianism would apply to this form as well. 
6.8 THE ADEQUACY AND IMPACT OF UTILITARIANISM
The previous discussion has identified problems with utilitarianism that 
challenge its adequacy as a moral theory—at least according to some crit-
ics. These include the ambiguity of key concepts, the practical tasks for 
moral agency, a level of expectation so demanding it leaves no room for 
supererogation, and the contested status of moral rules and principles.
Beyond these issues internal to the theory, many critics have pointed 
out that this approach gives no place to moral sentiments or emotions. 
The moral agent is, much like Mill himself in his early years, a dispassion-
ate, rational calculator. Even in Mill’s day, the doctrine was thought to be 
“cold and unsympathizing” (Obj. 5). Contributing to this assessment is a 
related issue: the flat impartiality of the calculations. Normal human beings 
develop strong emotional ties, close relations, with family and friends, 
but utilitarians take no count of these relationships. Since each and every 
person counts as one, I have no reason to privilege the goodness for my 
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children or my spouse or parents over those of distant people unknown 
to me. Indeed, it would be wrong for me to be more concerned about my 
daughter than a stranger, to choose her goodness over theirs. But partial-
ity to ourselves and those we love, along with the emotions connected to 
care and compassion, are deeply embedded aspects of moral life. 
What this criticism reveals is that the natural home of utilitarian think-
ing is the domain of ethical social policy—issues such as health care and 
criminal punishment. It fits well the considerations of military policy, the 
corporate boardroom, and the legislature. Its concern for the greatest 
good is directed toward the greatest number of individuals, but these are 
individuals abstracted to a number, without consideration of their indi-
viduality, without any nod to special relationships among them. 
Utilitarian theory does appear to harmonize all dimension of one’s 
life (though with the austerity noted above), giving us one principle by 
which to act in all situations. But some critics have argued the utilitar-
ianism may enjoin a person to violate their integrity. Imagine this case:
Josh, an employee of an American corporation working in the 
Middle East is kidnapped by terrorists and brought to a camp 
where about twenty-five men, women, and children are captive. He 
learns that these prisoners will soon be executed by their captors, 
their murders to be publicized to stoke fear and recruit others will-
ing to kill. Josh, an unexpected American hostage, is a prize and 
will not be killed, but will be traded for weapons. But he is given a 
choice: he will be given a gun, and if he will select and kill one of the 
prisoners, all the others will be spared and released; if he declines, 
they will all be executed as planned. The prisoners overhear this 
bargain and besiege him to accept the bargain.25
The act of highest utility is clear: Josh is morally obligated to choose and 
kill a prisoner. Critics like Bernard Williams (1929–2003), claim that utili-
tarian calculation may, as in this situation, compel us to abandon our most 
cherished beliefs and principles, to destroy our integrity. In dire cases 
such as this, someone else (the terrorist captor) has structured a situa-
tion into which a moral agent (Josh) is thrust, disrupting the agent’s own 
projects and plans, values and choices. It is another (malevolent) agent 
that has established the architecture of choices, not Josh. Utilitarians 
may argue that “integrity” is being used as a name for a set of principles 
that are held without regard to consequences. A true utilitarian finds the 
decision simple (though serious) and feels no loss of integrity in saving 
many lives by taking one—just as Mill says we experience no loss of justice 
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when theft or kidnap is necessary to save a life. But surely this is not just 
“another problem solved.” We would find something wrong with Josh if that 
were his response. There is little doubt that a strictly utilitarian approach 
would sometimes require us to ignore traditional moral touchstones. 
The British philosopher and Nobel laureate, Bertrand Russell, was 
the godson of John Stuart Mill. He wrote an essay in the 1920s called 
“The Harm that Good Men Do,” in which he said, “A hundred years ago 
there lived a philosopher named Jeremy Bentham, who was universally 
recognised to be a very wicked man.... I ... discovered what was the really 
serious charge against him. It was no less than this: that he defined a 
‘good’ man as a man who does good.” Mill himself described Bentham as 
“the great subversive.” These quotations relish the utilitarian’s posture 
as one who rejects the constraints of received, authoritative morality in 
favor of empirical results, or reasonable expectations of them. For Russell, 
much of the harm done in the world was done by people who claimed to 
be acting in accord with morality, but were heedless of the actual conse-
quences of their actions.
Enlightenment liberalism represents, in part, a rejection of any moral-
ity that is directed toward virtuous fitness for a life after death in favor of 
personal fulfillment and social progress in this life. Resisting the egoistic 
preoccupation that may accompany the individualism of the Enlightenment, 
utilitarianism reaches outward to society and forward to the future and 
our descendants. One of its attractions to me is the ethical vividness it 
imparts to the consequences of our actions for future generations. There 
is, though, little guidance from utilitarian theorists regarding the time-
frame we are to use in considering consequences. Consider a policy for the 
fossil fuel industry that benefits those now alive, saving jobs and reduc-
ing costs, while ignoring climate change and resource depletion problems 
for future generations. Does it have more “visible” utility than one that 
addresses climate change but requires hardships now? This issue of near 
versus far term, of those now alive versus future generations is a matter 
of the purview of our moral interest, and it is a problem for all forms of 
consequentialism (as we saw with egoism and its “enlightened” varieties). 
Concern with this life, rather than a life after death, can too often truncate 
to a concern only with the here and now or the near future. 
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1 Is Project Prevention doing morally good work? (Reviewing the 
material cited in notes 1–3 may be helpful in reaching a considered 
judgment.) 
2 Bentham lists “propinquity” (nearness in time) as one of the 
measures of pleasure, presumably valuing an immediate pleasure 
more than one in the future. Psychologists have demonstrated 
our natural tendency to do this, but they call it “discounting the 
future” and consider it a cognitive bias—a minor but predictable 
irrationality. Yet “deferred gratification” is also considered a mark 
of maturity. Is it valid to discount future rewards? (Remember 
the issue is not uncertainty—Bentham lists certainty as a 
separate criterion.) Would propinquity remove concern for future 
generations? 
3 Explain why is it “better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied”? If Mill has smuggled in a good other than pleasure, what 
is it?
4 Refute this claim: Watching or playing rugby and reading or writing 
poetry are equally worthwhile activities, and so are poker and 
physics.
5 “Utilitarians cannot protect the rights of individuals.” Explain why 
this claim is plausible. Do you agree with it, or can a sophisticated 
utilitarian give an adequate reply?
6 A familiar case for utilitarian analysis is this: Would you torture a 
terrorist to discover the location of a bomb set to detonate within 
hours? But what if the terrorist, the one who placed the bomb, was 
a thirteen-year-old? 
7 Explain why act utilitarianism makes supererogation impossible.
8 Lifeboat cannibalism: After a devastating gale, a crew of men 
endured nearly three dreadful weeks in a 13-foot lifeboat. They 
debated drawing lots for a sacrificial victim, some noting that it 
would be better for one to die so the others could have a chance 
to survive. Some pointed out they had wives and families at 
home; others were single. The next day, however, the cabin boy, 
Parker, fell into a coma. Taking matters into his own hands, a man 
named Dudley said a prayer and then killed Parker with a knife. 
The remaining men then drank his blood and ate his flesh. They 
thus survived for several days more when a ship was sighted and 
rescued them. Did Dudley do the right thing? [This is the case of 
Regina vs. Dudley and Stephens (1884), a famous British case.] 
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QUESTIONS FOR PERSONAL REFLECTION
1 Mill claims that due to the psychology of association, means to the 
end of happiness can, over time, become components of happiness 
itself: if playing tennis makes me happy, it can become true that a 
happy life for me must include tennis. What are the components of 
a happy life for you?
2 Consider this claim: “There is not one moral principle, however 
compelling, that could not properly be overridden or violated in 
certain circumstances.” 
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NOTES
  1 Unless given special citation, the facts, figures, and quotations in 
this case are drawn from the Project Prevention website: http://
projectprevention.org/ (accessed July 2018). 
 2 Jon Swaine, “Drug addict sterilised for cash—but can Barbara 
Harris save our babies?” The Daily Telegraph. October 19, 2010: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/8071664/Drug-addict-
sterilised-for-cash-but-can-Barbara-Harris-save-our-babies.html 
(accessed July 2018).  
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 3 See the discussion of the evolution of Ms. Harris’s comments on 
Wikipedia at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Prevention 
(accessed July 2018). 
 4 Quoted in Swaine, “Drug addict sterilised for cash.”
 5 For a history of utilitarianism, see Bart Shulz, The Happiness 
Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2017). 
 6 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1907), Book III, Chapter 
xiii.4, 382.
 7 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, Chapter XVII, Section 1.iv, n. 122.
 8 Images of the auto-icon abound on the Internet, but University 
College London has developed a high-resolution, rotating image 
of it at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/who/autoicon/
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